Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss a phenomenon highlighted in Confucian thought that I refer to as 'ethical self-commitment.' The purpose is to present a certain perspective on our ethical life that is distinctive of the Confucian ethical tradition, explore its implications, and draw out some of its features that might have a contemporary intelligibility and appeal. In addition, I will consider the question whether ethical self-commitment might evolve into a problematic form of ethical self-indulgence. The notion of ethical self-commitment is not intended to correspond to any specific attribute highlighted in Confucian thought. Instead, I use the notion to refer to a phenomenon that is related to the Confucian understanding of the ethical attribute yi 義 (propriety) as well as other attributes such as cheng 誠 (wholeness), xu 虛 (vacuity) and jing 靜 (stillness).
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In section 2, I present the historical background to the Confucian understanding of yi, and introduce one aspect of the notion of ethical self-commitment against this background. My discussion in this section draws on the textual studies I have conducted elsewhere. 2 In section 3, I give a more systematic account of this aspect of ethical self-commitment, relating it to phenomena highlighted in contemporary discussions of the notion of self-respect. In section 4, I consider how this aspect of self-commitment leads to a detached posture of the mind that I refer to as 'reflective equanimity.' In section 5, I introduce another aspect of the notion of ethical self-commitment that has to do with a phenomenon that I refer to as 'purity of the mind' and that is related to the Confucian understanding of cheng, xu and jing. The discussion of cheng, xu and jing again draws on textual studies I have conducted elsewhere, while my discussion of reflective equanimity and of purity in sections 4
and 5 draws on a series of earlier papers.
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In section 6, I introduce the notion of ethical self-indulgence, and consider the potential for ethical self-indulgence in relation to a reflective concern with one's own ethical qualities, a reflective concern that I refer to as 'ethical self-regard.' In this section, I draw on contemporary discussions of the phenomenon of 'moral self-indulgence' and of an objection to ethical views that focus on the notion of virtue, to the effect that these views are too self-centered. In section 7, I consider the potential for ethical self-indulgence specifically in relation to ethical self-commitment.
Finally, in section 8, I conclude with some general observations about the Confucian position.
The Confucian Understanding of Yi
In early Confucian thought, yi 義 (propriety) is often mentioned along with two other attributes, ren 仁 (humaneness) and li 禮 (observance of the rites). 4 Ren, as one attribute among others, has to do primarily with one's concern for the interests and well-being of others. Such a concern is sometimes presented in later Confucian thought in terms of one's forming one body with others, in the sense that one is attentive and sensitive to others' well-being in the way that one is attentive and sensitive to what happens to parts of one's own body.
Li is used to refer to rules of conduct governing ceremonial behavior in recurring social contexts as well as behavior appropriate to one's social position. As an attribute of a person, it refers to a general disposition to follow such rules, with special emphasis on the attitude behind such behavior. This attitude is described in a number of ways, but what is common to these descriptions is a general attitude that involves one's focusing on and having a serious regard for others in a way that would have been appropriate to someone of higher status than oneself. 5 At the same time, one avoids having oneself at the forefront of one's thinking when interacting with othersfor example, one does not unnecessarily display oneself nor seek attention and admiration.
As for yi, its earlier meaning had to do with a sense of honor and an absence of disgrace; it was a matter of not allowing oneself to be subject to disgraceful treatment. One's attitude toward disgrace ( ru 辱), is referred to as chi 恥. Chi focuses on disgrace as something beneath oneself that lowers one's standing. Though often translated as "shame," chi differs from contemporary Western notions of shame in important respects. It can be directed toward something contemplated as well as something that has already come about. It is associated not with the thought of being seen or the urge to hide oneself, but with the thought of being tainted and the urge to
cleanse oneself of what is tainting. 6 Chi is linked to a resolution to either remedy the disgraceful situation if it has already obtained, or to distance oneself from or pre-empt a potentially disgraceful situation if it has not yet come about.
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In early China, what is regarded as disgraceful is often treatment that is insulting (wu 侮) by public standards, such as being beaten in public, being stared in the eyes, or being treated in violation of certain accepted protocols of conduct that include li.
Correspondingly, chi is associated with not just a sense of being tainted by a disgraceful situation, but also anger at the offending party and thoughts of vengeance.
Early Confucians, however, advocate a transformation in what one regards as disgraceful -it should not be a matter of how others view or treat us, but a matter of our own ethical conduct. The proper object of chi is the ethical shortcoming in one's conduct, and chi is no longer linked to thoughts of vengeance. Instead, it has more to do with the resolve to distance oneself from certain situations that can be ethically tainting on oneself and to correct such situations should they arise.
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On the Confucian view, yi has to do with a resolve to distance oneself from disgraceful situations where disgrace is understood in ethical terms. It is a firm commitment to certain ethical standards, of such a kind that it can override personal interests of the most pressing kind, including one's own life. The Confucians do not deny that other conditions of life are important, but for them there is nothing more important than following the ethical path, and any other pursuit in life should be subject to the constraints of the ethical. Furthermore, it is fully within one's control to live up to the ethical standards to which one is committed, and this commitment to the ethical is independent of external influence. Someone so committed will not be led to deviate from the ethical by external influences, and this commitment itself is also 6 One example from Mengzi 2A:9, the context of which clearly relates to chi, is one's sitting on charcoal while wearing court clothes. 7 For further elaboration on chi, see Shun (1997), pp. 58-63. 8 In a discussion of moral taint, Marina Oshana describes it as a fundamental disfigurement of the moral psyche and a compromise of the moral personality (p. 356). The Confucian notion of chi need not be associated with an ethical shortcoming that goes as deep as this, though the shortcoming is not superficial as would be suggested by the term "stain." For example, the object of chi can be an ethically problematic action of oneself. This shortcoming betrays flaws in one's character and so is not superficial, but such flaws can be remedied through one's own efforts and so need not constitute a major and fundamental disfigurement.
something that no external force can deprive one of.
Mencius sometimes contrasts ren and yi by saying that ren has to do with the human heart while yi has to do with the human path. 9 His point is that, while ren has to do with one's affective concern for others, yi has to do with the propriety of one's conduct. Yi also differs from both ren and li in another way. Unlike ren and li, yi involves an element of reflectivity in that it presupposes one's having a conception of certain ethical standards to which one's way of life should conform. Furthermore, one is motivated by that conception, and is firmly committed not to allow oneself to fall below such standards. For now, I will use the notion of ethical self-commitment to refer to such a commitment. Later, I will broaden the notion to include a commitment not just to acting in conformity with certain ethical standards but also to shaping one's whole person in accordance with a reflective conception of the ethical.
3. Ethical Self-Commitment and Self-Respect
The notion of ethical self-commitment relates to certain phenomena highlighted in contemporary discussions of self-respect. Without focusing too much on the different usages of the term "self-respect," it would nevertheless be useful to consider the phenomena with which its use has been associated and to situate the notion of ethical self-commitment in relation to them.
One phenomenon has to do with a favorable view of oneself by virtue of certain positive qualities one has, just as one might form a favorable view of another person based on certain positive qualities that the other person has. The phenomenon is often discussed in relation to self-esteem, though it might also provide one sense in which we may speak of self-respect -just as one can esteem or respect another person for certain qualities that the other person has, one can also esteem or respect oneself for having such qualities.
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Another phenomenon has to do with an ideal conception of the kind of life one lives, and a commitment not to fall below the standards that define such a way of The notion of ethical self-commitment, understood in this manner, might also characterize other ethical traditions besides the Confucian tradition. However, the way it is viewed by the Confucians takes on a distinctive form. We saw earlier that, for them, a failure to live up to the relevant standards is associated with chi, which differs from the notion of shame. In addition, they relate ethical self-commitment to a range Such a person maintains an independence from the way she is viewed by others.
While she might desire appreciation by others and is sensitive to others' opinions as indicators of her own qualities, she will stand firm on the standards to which she is committed even if not appreciated by others. Even when looked down upon for external factors such as social status, she is little affected as she can take comfort in the realization that she has lived up to the standards to which she is committed.
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This sense of transcendence also extends to the way she is treated by others. The
Confucians do not deny that how we are viewed or treated by others does matter.
Confucius did lament the lack of appreciation by others, and certain kinds of treatment can of course be humiliating and hurtful even to the Confucians. The 16 The difference in the two kinds of response is conveyed by the difference between the terms chi 恥 and wu 恶 in classical Chinese, where the latter can be used of others' as well as one's own ethical shortcoming while the former can only be used of one's own ethical shortcoming -see Shun (1997) , pp. 58-60. Elizabeth Telfer also notes that, in self-respect, my relation to the standards to which I am committed is not merely that of a commitment to standards that apply to all; instead, I regard myself as dishonored or degraded if I fall short of such standards. For this reason, she further adds that the conative aspect of self-respect is an "egoistically-tinged motive" (pp. 115-116). 17 A similar point is made by Colin Bird in relation to the Stoic view of self-respect (p. 19).
Confucian position is that, even though these things do matter, they pale in significance compared to our own ethical qualities. When we do not fare well in relation to the former, at least the latter is something we can fall back on and take consolation in.
This sense of transcendence also extends to other external circumstances of life.
When presented with adverse circumstances that are either literally not within one's control or can only be altered through unethical means that one would not adopt, the person may still be affected-she may feel sorrow at the death of a beloved one, be disappointed by the lack of appreciation by others, or lament the ethical corruption of the times. But she would not be psychologically disturbed-she would not be bitter or resentful, would not devote energy to complaining about the outcome, and would not dwell on thoughts about how things could have been different nor seek to alter things by improper means. Instead, she would take contentment in the ethical in that she is immersed in the ethical and flows along with it with a sense of ease and without anxiety.
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To elaborate, the truly ethical person cannot be harmed by others or by external circumstances in a way that is of deepest significance to her. 19 She does attach importance to various pursuits and conditions of life other than the ethical, and so she can be affected if things do not go well. She can be frustrated if she fails in her endeavors, can feel sorrow upon the loss of a loved one, and can feel hurt at the way she has been treated by others. In these various ways, she can still be harmed. In the previous section, we also considered a two-tiered picture of the mind, where the mind's second level operation involves the posture of reflectivity equanimity. To distinguish between these two aspects of the operation of the mind at the second level, I will refer to them as the 'directive' aspect and the 'detached' aspect.
The 'directive' aspect involves the mind's being constantly watchful over its first level responses to ensure that they are properly directed. The 'detached' aspect refers to the posture of the mind that enables the person to stand apart from his immediate responses to the environment even if things go against her wishes and even if she responds with disappointment, frustration, pain, or sorrow.
Although we have spoken of two different levels on which the mind operates, done what is ethically appropriate than on the well-being of the intended recipient of the helping action?
Such potential misdirection of ethical attention has often been labeled 'moral self-indulgence,' and has been highlighted in an objection to ethical views that focus on the notion of virtue, to the effect that such ethical views are too 'self-centered.' I will from now on refer to as 'ethical self-indulgence' a problematic redirection of one's attention toward oneself in an ethical context. 26 Before considering ethical self-indulgence in relation specifically to ethical self-commitment, I will first consider it as a potential problem for ethical views that emphasize a reflective concern with one's own ethical qualities, a concern that I will refer to as 'ethical self-regard.'
6. Ethical Self-Regard and Ethical Self-Indulgence I will use the term "self-regard" to refer to any kind of concern with oneself, that is, any state of mind in which one's attention, thoughts, and motivations are directed to something related to oneself. This is the sense in which we refer to a desire whose object has to do with something related to oneself as a self-regarding desire. As for "ethical self-regard," it refers to any kind of concern that is directed to the ethical qualities of oneself, where the ethical has to do with a conception of how humans should live. For example, a concern with one's having qualities that embody this ethical conception is a form of ethical self-regard, and so is a concern that one acts in a particular situation in a manner consistent with such a conception. Ethical self-commitment, as we have introduced the notion, is one form of ethical self-regard.
Corresponding to self-regard, we may use "self-centeredness" to refer to the evolvement of self-regard into forms that place an inappropriate focus on oneself.
Similarly, corresponding to the notion of ethical self-regard, we may use "ethical self-indulgence" to refer to the evolvement of ethical self-regard into forms that place an inappropriate focus on oneself. Just as ethical self-regard is a form of self-regard, ethical self-indulgence is a form of self-centeredness. Later Confucians ascribe ethical failure to self-centeredness, for which they have a specific term, si 私. We will not be concerned with self-centeredness as such, but only with ethical self-indulgence.
Ethical self-regard involves a reflective conception of certain qualities as ethically desirable, and one's being motivated in a way that is guided by that conception. It is a kind of reflexive concern-it presupposes one's having an ideal conception of the qualities of oneself and of one's actions, one's applying that conception to oneself, and one's being motivated by that conception. 27 Such a reflexive concern is not problematic as such, but becomes problematic when it evolves into a form that involves a misdirection of one's thoughts, attention, and concern, in a way that places an undue focus on oneself.
Such problematic evolvement can take different forms. For example, one may come to care more about one's having the relevant ethical qualities than caring about the things that one would care about by virtue of having such qualities. That is, one's image of oneself as having such qualities is more important in one's thoughts than the things that would be regarded as important by someone with such qualities. 28 When this happens, the second-order motivation to have these qualities in oneself comes to displace the first order motivations that are part of the qualities with which that second order motivation is concerned. Such displacement can manifest itself in different ways. One might be thinking too often about how good one is or should be, ignoring pressing other-regarding needs as a result of this over-concern with self-improvement. Or one might be viewing oneself as being in ethical competition with others, and be filled with anxieties about one's ethical shortcomings.
Alternatively, the problematic evolvement may take the form of one's attention being too other-directed, but in a way that is still focused on oneself -one is too concerned about the ethical assessment of oneself by others. In this case, what is at work is not one's having an image of oneself as having certain qualities, but one's having an image of oneself as being seen by others as having certain qualities. In any of these forms, the problematic evolvement of ethical self-regard involves a shift of one's thoughts and attention, even though the object of one's attention might by itself appear not different from that in the unproblematic cases of a concern with one's own to be a practical problem in certain contexts, there appears no general theoretical reason to believe that it will be a problem for any reflective concern with one's own ethical qualities.
One line of thought notes that the terms we use to describe ethically desirable qualities do not typically occur in the deliberation of the person with such qualities.
These 'virtue terms' are more typically third person descriptions of someone with the qualities. A reflective concern with cultivating such qualities in oneself, framed in these terms, would show that one is concerned primarily with these third person descriptions of oneself, and hence with how others view oneself.
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Without denying that someone concerned with these qualities might, as a matter fact, become more concerned with how she is viewed by others, there is no reason to believe that such a concern must evolve in this manner. Even if the terms describing these qualities are typically used as third person descriptions, one's concern with the qualities describable in such terms need not be a concern with one's being describable by others in a certain way. Instead, it could be a concern with one's becoming like the kind of person that one would oneself describe in that way. That is, the third person description is a description of others by oneself, rather than of oneself by others. And in being so concerned, the primary object of one's concern need not be the description as such, but could still be one's having certain qualities which, as it happens, can be described in this way.
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Other attempts to link a reflective concern with one's own ethical qualities to ethical self-indulgence can be found in recent discussions surrounding the idea of 'virtue ethics.' For example, some have made the point that, in an ethical view that focuses on the virtues, such a reflective concern could displace a concern for the well-being or for the ethical qualities of others. Various responses to this line of thought can be found in the literature, and I will not rehearse the details here. 33 The basic point is that there is no general theoretical reason why such a reflective concern must evolve in this problematic manner. And, within Confucian thought, the emphasis on the cultivation of various ethical attributes is actually coupled with the view that the truly ethical person is someone who is also concerned for the well-being as well as ethical qualities of others.
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Certain other attempts to link a reflective concern with one's own ethical qualities to ethical self-indulgence invoke additional assumptions. For example, some have highlighted the potential for ethical self-indulgence if the concern for the well-being or the ethical qualities of others is viewed as somehow instrumental to the 31 See Bernard Williams (1985) , pp. 10-11. concern with one's own ethical qualities. 35 Admittedly, there can be additional assumptions invoked that would give reason to believe that a reflective concern with one's own ethical qualities will lead inevitably to ethical self-indulgence. But this is a problem not for the reflective concern as such; it is a problem only for ethical views that endorse these additional assumptions. There is no reason why the reflective concern must itself be coupled with such assumptions, such as the assumption that the good of others is instrumental to one's own good.
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7. Ethical Self-Commitment and Ethical Self-Indulgence
Let us turn now to ethical self-commitment, one aspect of which is built into the Confucian understanding of yi. The potential for ethical self-indulgence arises for yi in a way that it does not for other ethical attributes such as ren and li. A person of ren or li will have appropriate concern or regard for others, but not necessarily a reflective concern for her own ethical qualities. By contrast, yi as such already embodies a reflective conception of certain ethical standards that one should not fall short of.
Furthermore, the perspective of the yi person is not just that these are standards that everyone should abide by and hence that she should also abide by them. Rather, there is an added element to her perspective that relates her own honor or disgrace to these standards, and it is this element that makes yi particularly vulnerable to the charge of ethical self-indulgence.
The same potential worry applies to the broader notion of ethical self-commitment. Ethical self-commitment involves a reflective conception of the ethical and a commitment to live up to that conception. The ethical person would be responding in various ways to the environment, while that reflective conception would at the same time be at work on another level in the two respects described earlier, the 'directive' and the 'detached.' The potential worry is that the operation of this reflective conception might affect the first level responses in a way that leads to a problematic redirection of one's thoughts and attention. This worry can be described in terms of a potential tension in combining two points of view. From 'inside' the perspective of the ethical person, one's attention is on what someone with the ethically desirable qualities would regard as important. But having a reflective conception of these qualities as ethically desirable involves an 'outside' perspective from which the attention is on these qualities themselves. The concern is that taking up this outside point of view would alienate one from the inside makes no difference to the way one lives. The key to addressing the worry about ethical self-indulgence is to distinguish between two kinds of motivational role.
Drawing on a distinction I made in previous publications, a certain consideration will be playing a directly motivating role in case one acts because one expects one's action to bring about a desirable effect relative to that consideration, and is prepared to adjust one's action so as to bring about or maximize such effect. By contrast, it will be playing a constraining role if, when one acts, one is prepared to avoid courses of action that have an undesirable effect relative to that consideration or to adjust one's action to minimize such effect. For example, financial considerations will be playing a directly motivating role in a helping action if one helps with the goal of financial gain, but only a constraining role if one helps in a way that avoids excessive financial cost 37 See Bernard Williams (1985) , pp. 50-52. 38 In Williams (1981) , p. 49, Bernard Williams makes the suggestion that to construe integrity as a motive smacks of moral self-indulgence because this is to represent it in one's thoughts in an objectionably reflexive way, having to do with thoughts about oneself and one's own character. Some might make a similar point in relation to motivation by a reflective conception of the ethically desirable qualities. 39 See, for example, Rosalind Hursthouse, See Christopher Toner, pp. 600-601. 41 See Shun (1996), pp. 92-93. or minimizes such cost.
Even when a consideration plays a constraining role, it will make a difference to a person's thoughts and feelings in acting. For example, if financial considerations play a constraining role with regard to a helping action, one may have thoughts about the cost of helping and may be relieved at finding a more affordable way of helping.
These aspects of a helping action are not problematic as such. But if financial considerations play a directly motivating role, they will affect the person's thoughts and feelings in a more fundamental way. They will become her main guiding thoughts in helping and will also become the main measure of success. What she will take pleasure in is financial gain as such, not just being able to help in an affordable manner. As a result, not only will the recipient of the helping action feel that his being helped is instrumental to her financial gain, but her attention will be redirected in a way that may lead her to miss certain features of the situation, resulting in her failing to help in a way that she otherwise could.
Thus, it is only when other considerations play a directly motivating role, rather we have said so far requires it to play that role.
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Consider the 'directive' aspect of the mind's operations. It involves the mind's endorsing a reflective conception of the ethical, and its being ready to intervene on the basis of that conception if anything goes wrong or is about to go wrong. This aspect of the mind's operation requires the reflective conception to play only a constraining, not directly motivating, role. A constraining role does imply that one would refrain from doing anything that deviates from that conception in the course of helping. But this is just to say that one would not act unethically in order to help, which is exactly what we would expect of the truly ethical person. When the person helps, she will be helping out of a genuine concern for the well-being of the recipient, not in order to live up to that reflective conception. And when she succeeds in helping, she will take pleasure primarily in the recipient's having been helped, not in her having been able to act ethically.
Consider now the 'detached' posture of the mind that enables the truly ethical person to remain undisturbed despite the adverse circumstances of life. Suppose the ethically appropriate thing for her to do is to help someone in need, and though she attempts to do so, she fails to provide relief due to external hindrances. While feeling frustration and sorrow, she will not feel disturbed, taking comfort in the fact that she has done what is ethically appropriate. Would this posture show that she is putting more weight on her having acted ethically than on the well-being of others?
Now, in a sense, she does regard her following the ethical path as more important than the external conditions of life, including the well-being of others. But this is true only in the sense that she would not act unethically even if by doing so she can accomplish her goals including relieving the suffering of others. This constraining role of the reflective conception does not lead to a problematic redirection of her emotional engagement with the situation. Just as her awareness that she has acted ethically does not detract from the pleasure she feels at the recipient's having been helped when her helping action succeeds, it does not detract from her frustration and sorrow when her helping action fails. Her detached posture implies only that she stays anchored in her awareness that she has followed the ethical path and is not vulnerable to uncertainty, temptation to act unethically, or anxiety about how things could have been different. It does not mean that her frustration and sorrow are any less real or are replaced by some other kind of emotional response. They are still her dominant emotional responses, though without the disturbing effects just described.
To summarize, as long as the reflective conception of the ethical plays only a constraining role, this will not lead to an objectionable form of ethical self-indulgence.
There might be moments when the ethical person would engage in conscious self-reflection, consciously thinking about her living up to this reflective conception.
But this happens typically outside the immediate contexts of action and will not displace the thoughts and feelings that typically characterize the ethical person when she does act. For the person to act out of yi in these contexts, it seems, would be for her to act out of a concern that she herself lives up to certain standards in her actions, and this 43 See Robin S. Dillon, p. 132. would constitute an objectionable redirection of her thoughts and attention. The focus, it seems, is too much on herself -she would be acting out of a concern that she acts in a way that is worthy of herself.
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There is genuine substance to this worry. A similar point applies to ethical self-commitment as a broader notion that includes a commitment to ensuring that all aspects of one's own person, including one's subtle thoughts and motivations as well as actions, conform to the reflective ethical conception that one endorses. Just as yi might play a more active role when someone less than ethical is tempted to act inappropriately, ethical self-commitment in this broader sense also plays an active role when someone still falls short of that reflective conception. The person may have conscious and deliberate thoughts about how she can reshape herself in the ethical direction. This happens in the process of self-cultivation, and we often find in Confucian texts, especially in later Confucian thought, records of conversations between a master and his students in this connection.
But just as yi plays only a constraining role in relation to the actions of the truly ethical person, ethical self-commitment in the broader sense plays only a constraining role in relation to the psychology of the truly ethical person. This role will not lead to a misdirection of her thoughts and attention, and so there is no general theoretical 44 Elizabeth Telfer describes a commitment to one's own worthy behavior as an "egoistically tinged motive" (p. 116), and further notes that self-respect is too egoistic to be an appropriate basis for other-regarding conduct (p. 121). 45 Compare Bernard Williams' point about how it could be inappropriate to construe integrity as a motive; see Williams (1981), p. 49. reason to believe that idealizing ethical self-commitment will render an ethical view vulnerable to the charge of ethical self-indulgence.
But this does not mean that ethical self-indulgence is not a genuine practical concern for such ethical views, in the sense that there is a practical risk of ethical self-commitment evolving in a problematic direction for certain individuals. On one interpretation, Mencius urges people not to be over-eager and not to be overly focused on their becoming ethical, in a way that ends up being detrimental to their own ethical development. 46 And Wang Yangming also makes the point that the truly good person would not be consciously aiming at doing good; to have such conscious aims would itself detract from genuine goodness. 47 Thus, though ethical self-indulgence is not a general theoretical worry for the Confucian position, the Confucians are very much sensitive to the practical dangers of a misdirection of attention resulting from one's overly focusing on one's own ethical qualities.
